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IN THE JUNGLE OF CITIESt 
Anthony Chase* 
AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC POLICY: AN UPDATE OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIO-
LENCE. Edited by Lynn A. Curtis. New Haven: Yale University 
Press. 1985. Pp. xi, 263. Cloth, $23; paper, $8.95. 
THE MIAMI RIOT OF 1980: CROSSING THE BOUNDS. By Bruce Porter 
and Marvin Dunn. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co. 1984. Pp. 
xiv, 206. Cloth, $22; paper, $10.95. 
At various points in Capital I allude to the fate that befell the plebeians 
of ancient Rome. They were originally free peasants, each tilling his 
own plot on his own behalf. In the course of Roman history they were 
expropriated .... Thus one fine morning there were, on the one side, free 
men stripped of everything but their labour-power, and on the other, 
ready to exploit their labour, owners of all the acquired wealth. What 
happened? The Roman proletarians became, not wage-labourers, but an 
idle mob more abject than those who used to be called "poor whites" in 
the southern United States .... 
-Karl Marx1 
This review provides concentrated discussion of two recent, impor-
tant books on criminal violence in American society. The first of 
these, American Violence and Public Policy, is a collection of nine es-
says edited, introduced, and brought to a programmatic conclusion by 
Lynn A. Curtis.2 Funded by the Ford Foundation (p. xi), the Curtis 
volume is designed as an "updating" of several well-known, nationally 
t Title borrowed from B. BRECHT, IN THE JUNGLE OF CITIES: THE FIGHT BETWEEN Two 
MEN IN THE GIANT CITY OF CHICAGO (1924). Brecht was both fascinated and repelled by the 
criminal violence and sinister lifestyle of the American city and, in his early work, frequently 
deployed the violence of American urban culture as a metaphor for capitalist social relations in 
general. See B. BRECHT, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE CITY OF MAHAGONNY (1929); B. 
BRECHT, SAINT JOAN OF THE STOCKYARDS (1931); K. SCHOEPS, BERTOLT BRECHT 143 (1977): 
While marching, the demonstrators repeat key verses of the opera that stress that the law of 
the jungle prevails in Mahagonny. This now is the real Mahagonny, whose law courts are no 
worse than other law courts, as Brecht said. It is a Brechtian vision of a capitalist society. 
The hurricane - besides serving as an excellent dramatic device - reveals the true nature 
of Mahagonny. It is a city dominated by greed and exploitation. The demonstrators 
represent the advocates of capitalism. 
* Professor of Law, Nova University. B.A. 1972, University of Wisconsin; J.D. 1978, 
Wayne State University; LL.M. 1979, Harvard University. - Ed. 
1. K. MARX, A letter to the Editorial Board of Otechestvennye Zapiski (ca. 1878), in LATE 
MARX AND THE RUSSIAN ROAD: MARX AND "THE PERIPHERIES OF CAPITALISM" 136 (T. 
Shanin ed. 1983). 
2. Chairman Emeritus of the Eisenhower Foundation, Washington, D.C. 
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commissioned studies of criminal violence issued during the 1960s.3 
The second book discussed, The Miami Riot of 1980 by Bruce Porter4 
and Marvin Dunn, 5 represents an effort to confront some of the ques-
tions raised in the Curtis report - as well as in earlier, often ambi-
tious, overviews of American criminal violence6 - but within the 
specific context of the most widely publicized riot in an American city 
since the 1960s- a decade virtually identified in the popular imagina-
tion with foreign war, civil insurrection, and assassination. 7 
I. RIOTS AND CRIME 
In America, during the seventy years separating the release of 
D.W. Griffith's powerful film, The Birth Of A Nation, 8 and the use of 
deadly force against presumed muggers by New York "subway vigi-
3. See especially NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, 
To EsTABLISH JUSTICE, To INSURE DOMESTIC TRANQUILITY, FINAL REPORT (1969); see also 
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, THE 
CHALLENGE OF CRIME JN A FREE SOCIETY (1967) (sometimes referred to as "the Katzenbach 
report"); REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (T. Wicker 
intro. 1968) (sometimes referred to as "the Kerner report"). 
4. Director of the Journalism Program at Brooklyn College; Adjunct Professor, Columbia 
University Graduate School of Journalism. 
5. Associate Professor of Community Psychology, Florida International University. 
6. See, e.g., CRIME AND JUSTICE (L. Radzinowicz & M. Wolfgang 2d rev. ed. 1977); C. 
SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1978); J.Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT 
CRIME (2d rev. ed. 1983). None of these studies, however, deals systematically with corporate or 
"white collar" criminality in America, even where corporate criminality leads to violent harm. 
For analysis of violent crime committed by business enterprises and some of the reasons it has 
generally been ignored in the literature on criminal justice, see Glasbeek, Why Corporate Devi· 
ance is Not Treated as a Crime - The Need to Make "Profits" a Dirty Word, 22 OsGOODE HALL 
L.J. 393 (1984); see also J.H. REIMAN, THE RICH GET RICHER AND THE POOR GET PRISON: 
IDEOLOGY, CLASS, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1979); L.P. STROBEL, RECKLESS HOMICIDE? 
FORD'S PINTO TRIAL (1980); Green & Berry, Corporate Crime -L· White-Collar Crime Is Big 
Business, 240 NATION 689 (1985); Green & Berry, Corporate Crime-IL· Capitalist Punishment: 
Some Proposals, 240 NATION 731 (1985); Comment, Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: 
Can the Criminal Law Control Corporate Behavior?, 38 Sw. L.J. 1275 (1985); Comment, Crimi· 
nal Sentences for Corporations: Alternative Fining Mechanisms, 13 CALIF. L. REV. 443 (1985). 
For helpful overviews of the literature on criminal justice as a whole, see S. COHEN, VISIONS OF 
SOCIAL CONTROL: CRIME, PUNISHMENT AND CLASSIFICATION (1985); I. TAYLOR, P. WALTON 
& J. YOUNG, THE NEW CRIMINOLOGY: FOR A SOCIAL THEORY OF DEVIANCE (1973); Crimi· 
nal Law, in THE PoLmCS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 214-52 (D. Kairys ed. 1982). 
7. See R. CONOT, RIVERS OF BLOOD, YEARS OF DARKNESS (1967); D. NEWMAN, N. 
AMIDEI, B. CARTER, D. DAY, W. KRUVANT & J. RUSSELL, PROTEST, POLITICS, AND PROS· 
PERITY: BLACK AMERICANS AND WHITE INSTITUTIONS, 1940-75, at 18-23 (1978) [hereinafter 
cited as D. NEWMAN]; K. SALE, SDS (1973); W.A. WILLIAMS, The Imperial Frontier Under· 
mines Democracy at Home, in AMERICANS IN A CHANGING WORLD 415-48 (1978). 
8. Rogin, "The Sword Became A Flashing Vision'~· D. W. Griffith's The Birth Of A Nation, 
REPRESENTATIONS, Winter 1985, at 150: 
American movies were born, then, in a racist epic. "The film that started it all" [Herman G. 
Weinberg] builds to its sustained climax from two attempted rapes of white women by black 
men. It depicts, after the triumph of death in the Civil War and in Lincoln's assassination, a 
nation reborn from the ride of the white-robed Knights of Christ against black political and 
sexual revolution. 
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lante" Bernhard Goetz,9 national debate over a broad range of public 
policy issues has often been an indirect way of talking about race. 
Both violent street crime and ghetto riots10 share a direct and palpable 
relation to the just-repressed fears of much of the dominant white pop-
ulation of the United States.1 I This social psychodynamic of theorizing 
9. See Official Vigilantes, 240 NATION 129, 129 (1985): 
The case of Bernhard Goetz has become a kind of diagnostic test for sensitivity to issues of 
public justice, police authority and race relations. While many New Yorkers have reacted 
with riotous and racist fantasies of revenge, the press and political leaders have sought to set 
forth more palatable solutions to the problem of crime. There's an idea floating around for a 
National Police Corps that would bring middle-class students into the business of social 
control at the curbside level. It seems a fitting monument to the official vigilantism of the 
Reagan era. 
10. Riots and other forms of violent civil disturbance have a long and interesting social his-
tory. For a sense of the extraordinary range of approaches to writing about these events, see, e.g., 
R. DARNTON, THE GREAT CAT MAssACRE AND OTHER EPISODES IN FRENCH CULTURAL 
HISTORY 74-104 (1984); M. HANE, PEASANTS, REBELS, AND OUTCASTS: THE UNDERSIDE OF 
MODERN JAPAN 160-63 (1982) (discussing the rice riots of 1918, which were caused by war-time 
inflation and where there are interesting parallels between the treatment of burakumin in modern 
Japan and blacks in the modern United States); E. LADURJE, THE TERRITORY OF THE HISTO-
RIAN 111-31 (B. Reynolds & S. Reynolds trans. 1979); V.S. Naipaul, Power To The Caribbean 
People, in THE AFTERMATH OF SOVEREIGNTY: WEST INDIAN PERSPECTIVES 363 (D. Lowen-
thal &.L. Comitas eds. 1973) (discussing the relation between the Trinidad Carnival and the 
"Black Power Revolt of 1970"); J. RIEDER, CANARSIE: THE JEWS AND ITALIANS OF BROOK-
LYN AGAINST LIBERALISM 183-93 (1985) (discussing a secondary school racial incident in 
Brooklyn during 1976 characterized by "old rhythms of communal rivalry"); G. RUDE, IDEOL-
OGY AND POPULAR PROTEST (1980) (compact introduction to the subject by the premier Eng-
lish-language historian of crowds). During the last few decades, analysis of "the underside of 
history" has become an increasingly recognized genre of professional social science. See Legters, 
Who Speaks For The Workers?, 4 PRAXIS INTL. 438, 438 (1985): 
If there is a single, overriding, innovative accent in contemporary western historiography, it 
resides, most observers would probably agree, in the concern to illuminate those areas some-
times identified as the "underside" of history .... There is of course no reason not to extend 
the list to include such topics as banditry, secret societies, popular protest and rebellion. 
See also E. HOBSBAWM, PRIMmVE REBELS (1959); E. HOBSBAWM, BANDITS (rev. ed. 1981); E. 
HOBSBAWM, REVOLUTIONARIES: CONTEMPORARY EssAYS 220-33 (1973). 
11. White male fear of black economic competition was an early (and enduring) source of 
racial violence in the United States; see P.S. FONER, Blacks and the Labor Movement in Penn-
sylvania: The Beginnings, in EssAYS IN AFRO-AMERICAN HISTORY 77, 79 (1978): 
Between 1820 and 1850, Blacks not only lost their traditional means of employment but 
they also became the victims of violence. Eight major riots were directed against Black 
people in Philadelphia, and there were several in Pittsburgh. In each case, white mobs 
burned and looted Negro churches, meeting halls, and homes, and clubbed, stoned, and 
sometimes murdered Blacks. . . . [In the sweatshops] vigorous routine emerged, wages de-
clined, and opportunity for advancement was limited. All this made workmen reluctant to 
admit another source of cheap labor and more competition for wages. Early trade unions 
were designed as much to protect these exposed trades for white men as to win better work-
ing conditions and higher wages for their members. Blacks, naturally, were the scapegoats 
of the unions. 
During the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, socioeconomic and sexual-psychological fear 
of blacks became an undercurrent of the public politics of "law and order" as well as the private 
paranoia which led to de facto racial segregation organized by the leaders of the "white commu-
nity." See E.L. AYERS, VENGEANCE AND JUSTICE: CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN THE 19TH-
CENTURY AMERICAN SOUTH (1984); Berry, Repression Of Blacks In The South 1890-1945: En-
forcing The System Of Segregation, in THE AGE OF SEGREGATION: RACE RELATIONS IN THE 
SOUTH, 1890-1945, at 29 (R. Haws ed. 1978); J.W. CELL, THE HIGHEST STAGE OF WHITE 
SUPREMACY: THE ORIGINS OF SEGREGATION IN SOUTH AFRICA AND THE AMERICAN SOUTH 
(1982); THE FEAR OF CoNSPIRACY 102-48 (D.B. Davis ed. 1971); v. HARDING, THERE IS A 
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about crime and civil disturbance only complicates the task of writers 
such as those whose work this review analyzes. 
The inherently multiracial or multi-ethnic context of the crime 
problem in most international urban centers12 is shaped in the United 
States by features of race and class that seemed to crystallize in the 
events that took place in Miami, Florida, during 1979-1980. On the 
heels of a series of police actions that had infuriated many Miami 
blacks (Porter & Dunn, pp. 27-32), a thirty-three year old black insur-
ance agent named Arthur McDuffie was beaten to death by white po-
lice officers after he had run a red light on a borrowed motorcycle and 
led police on a high-speed chase that lasted eight minutes (p. 33). 
Within three minutes of his apprehension, McDuffie had been set upon 
by between six and twelve Dade County officers who used eighteen-
inch Kelite police flashlights to crush his skull (pp. 34-35). As Porter 
and Dunn point out: 
From the medical examiner's testimony, it became clear that when Mc-
Duffie's skull was fractured, he was lying face down with his head 
against the pavement. There was no possibility of his head recoiling 
from the blows - thus the extreme severity of the fractures. He was 
also handcuffed at the time. [p. 38] 
The Dade County officers on the scene had a marked patrol car 
run over McDuffie's motorcycle to make it look like it had been dam-
aged in an accident, and they reported that McDuffie had, in fact, been 
injured in a fall from his vehicle (p. 34). As the result of Dade County 
medical examiner Ron Wright's skepticism of this story and, eventu-
ally, police who had been on the scene deciding to speak to the state's 
attorney, the "coverup" began to unravel (pp. 35-36). The day before 
McDuffie was buried in his full-dress U.S. Marine Corps uniform, the 
State of Florida charged four white police officers with manslaughter 
and tampering with evidence in the death of McDuffie, the father of 
two small children (pp. 33, 36). By the time the officers were placed 
on trial, the charge against one of them, Alex Marrero, had been in-
creased to second-degree murder. An immunized police officer who 
had been on the scene testified at trial that Marrero had struck Mc-
Duffie as if he was chopping wood with an axe and that Marrero had 
said to other officers who were beating McDuffie: "Easy. One at a 
time" (pp. 36-39). 
After four weeks of trial, on May 17, 1980, an all-white jury in 
Tampa deliberated for less than three hours before finding all police 
officers not guilty on all charges. 13 Within another three hours, blacks 
RIVER: THE BLACK STRUGGLE FOR FREEDOM IN AMERICA (1981); M. MARABLE, FROM THE 
GRASSROOTS: EssAYS TOWARD AFRO-AMERICAN LIBERATION (1980); M. MARABLE, How 
CAPITALISM UNDERDEVELOPED BLACK AMERICA (1983). 
12. See T.R. GURR, P. GRABOSKY & R. HULA, THE POLITICS OF CRIME AND CONFLICT 
(1977). 
13. The reasons the State of Florida managed to lose its case are complex and uncertain. 
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living along 62nd Street at the edge of Liberty City in Miami were 
throwing rocks and bottles at passing automobiles carrying whites. A 
half hour later, what would become the Miami Riot of 1980 claimed 
its first victim: a white derelict was beaten up by a gang of black 
youths. Shortly thereafter, a car carrying three white youths in their 
teens or early twenties was bombarded with rocks and bottles, includ-
ing a chunk of concrete which went through the windshield. The 
driver lost control, struck an elderly black man and then pinned a 
black ten-year old girl against a housing project facade, severing the 
girl's leg and leaving a swath of blood across the front of the building. 
The mob dragged two of the car's occupants, Michael and Jeffrey 
Kulp, into the street and savagely beat them (pp. 47-52). Porter and 
Dunn observe: 
At one point someone picked up a yellow Miami Herald newspaper dis-
penser and brought it down on Jeffrey Kulp's head. [The Kulps] were 
shot several times with a revolver and run over by a green Cadillac, 
whose driver then came over and stabbed them with a screwdriver .... 
[A]n aged derelict, whom people in the community know only as "Er-
nest," approached Jeffrey Kulp, reached down and inserted a red rose in 
his bleeding mouth. [p. 52] 
Eighteen people died in the riot, including whites who were beaten 
to death by blacks, whites who were burned to death in their cars, a 
Guyanan immigrant whose body was found mutilated and who had, 
apparently, been taken for white (pp. 52-53, 173), blacks who were 
shot by police officers, a black teenager who was killed by a Jet Food 
Market security guard, blacks who were shot by roving white motor-
ists driving through black residential areas, and a police officer who 
died of a heart attack (pp. 71-73). Hundreds more were severely in-
jured and Dr. David Bernstein, chief surgeon at the fifth largest emer-
gency medical facility in the United States, remarked: "What 
impressed me, though, was the severity of the beatings that took place 
Saturday night. That was impressive. Just the severe skull fractures 
we were seeing, and the cases of mutilation" (p. 54). 
Was the Miami Riot of 1980 a seemingly atavistic event (like a 
1985 labor strike in the U.S. basic steel industry), incomprehensible 
after the gains of the civil rights movement; or an exclusive moment in 
the particular history of one urban social structure, understandable 
only in terms of a site-specific sociology; or an initial face-off from the 
Porter and Dunn have not written an exhaustive treatment of the state (and subsequent federal) 
trial, which would have required another entire book. Suffice it to say here, as Porter and Dunn 
do in their book, that for most black residents of Miami, 
the gray areas of the case - the contradictory testimony, the credibility of the police wit-
nesses, the way the prosecution had been conducted - had little meaning compared to the 
unendurable fact that a number of white policemen had beaten to death a black insurance 
man for what amounted to a traffic violation and that not one of them had gotten so much 
as a slap on the wrist from the courts. 
P. 48. 
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futuristic interzone warfare which could render American race rela-
tions more like those of Soweto and Johannesburg14 and American 
criminal justice more like the Gotham nightmare portrayed in the re-
cent social-science-fiction film, Escape From New York? 15 What 
should be the course of public policy on criminal violence in the 
United States, according to the contributors to the studies under 
review? 
II. INDIVIDUAL VIOLENCE 
Editor Lynn Curtis has divided American Violence and Public Pol-
icy into three sections: one dealing with individual violence, one with 
terrorism, and one with collective violence. The section on individual 
violence represents the lion's share of the book's research. Taking the 
contributors to this section as a whole, and emphasizing Curtis' 
programmatic synthesis of what are occasionally disparate viewpoints, 
American Violence and Public Policy comes to these conclusions: 
(1) After a long period of decline, violent crime rates in the United 
States demonstrated a sharp increase in the decade prior to, as well as 
in the decades following, publication of the major national crime re-
ports in the late 1960s.16 As Curtis points out, violent crime soared in 
spite of the fact that 
American incarceration rates are higher than those of any other industri-
14. See Adam, South Africa's Search For Legitimacy, 59 TELOS 45 (1984); v. CRAPANZANO, 
WAmNG: THE WHITES OF SOUTH AFRICA (1985); Johnstone, State Terror In South Africa, 54 
TELOS 115 (1982); Naude, Where is South Africa Going?, MONTHLY REV., July-Aug. 1985, at 
59; DeMarco, Soweto Revolt is Considered From Inside Out, IN THESE TIMES, Oct. 30-Nov. 5, 
1985, at 19 (reviewing s. SEPAMLA, A RIDE ON THE WHIRLWIND (1981)); South Africa's Year of 
Lost Chances, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Jan. 5, 1986, at I, col. 2 (Wash. Post reprint ed.). 
15. J. CARPENTER, EsCAPE FROM NEW YORK (1981); see K. KUMAR, PROPHECY AND 
PROGRESS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF INDUSTRIAL AND POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 7 (1978), quoted 
in S. COHEN, supra note 6, at 283 n.14: "Even the most routine science-fiction writer has more 
imagination and understanding than was revealed in the technocratic, jargon-ridden, commission 
reports, think-tank projections and social forecasts through which I dutifully plodded." See also 
s. COHEN, supra note 6, at 197-235; N. POULANTZAS, STATE, POWER, SOCIALISM (1978) (on 
draconian curtailment of "formal" liberties under new intensive systems of state control); Hall, 
Authoritarian Populism, NEW LEFT REv., May-June 1985, at 115; McMurtry, Fascism and Neo-
Conservatism: Is There A Difference?, 4 PRAXIS INTL. 86 (1984). 
16. Curtis, pp. 17-39, 118-23; see also C. SILBERMAN, supra note 6; Gurr, Historical Trends 
in Violent Crimes: A Critical Review of the Evidence, in 3 CRIME AND JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL 
REVIEW OF RESEARCH 295 (M. Tonry & N. Morris eds. 1981); s. COHEN, supra note 6, at 309 
n.6: 
There is, however, one variable - changing age-structure - which could reduce the level of 
crime. For some years, American criminologists have predicted that with ageing of the 
baby-boom cohort, crime rates would decline. For the past three years, this has already 
been happening and is likely to continue for at least the next decade, the usual "other things 
being equal." 
Nevertheless, after levelling off in the early 1980s, according to the FBI, violent crime increased 
during 1984; see Serious Crime Dropped in '84, N.Y. Times, July 29, 1985, at 10, col. 1 ("Serious 
crime nationwide dropped 2 percent in 1984, marking the third consecutive annual decline, but 
violent crime rose by 1 percent, with rape increasing 7 percent, the Federal Bureau of Investiga-
tion reported today."). 
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alized country except, notably, South Africa and the Soviet Union. This 
is especially true in the case of black males, who ... account for about 50 
percent of the prison population. One result is that prison is one of the 
few U.S. institutions dominated by blacks - or, in some regions, His-
panics. [p. 8] 
(2) It is essential to come to grips with the structural causes of 
crime if Americans genuinely wish to deal with the crime problem: 
"One response to those who said they had never seen a cause of crime 
is James Baldwin's observation that to be black in the United States 
'and be relatively conscious is to be in a rage almost all the time' " (p. 
5). 
(3) The actual causes of criminal violence in America are multiple 
but include - particularly - injustice, poverty, racism, and inade-
quate labor markets (pp. 5-6, 59, 66, 122, 205-06). Curtis states in' 
conclusion: 
I am persuaded . . . that to address the causes of individual violence, 
which disproportionately involves poor minorities as both offenders and 
victims, is also to address the causes of group disorder. The common 
base of grievance also implies that a federal policy of reducing crime and 
fear through targeted, carefully evaluated economic and social programs 
needs to be part of a more inclusive policy of reducing the black and 
Hispanic underclass. [p. 206] 
(4) The necessary crime-reducing program can be summarized 
under the heading: "Neighborhood, Family, and Employment" (p. 
205). It is true that this slogan could encompass the popular strategy 
of virtually any political party from the extreme Right to the extreme 
Left. But what Curtis specifically has in mind is a more community-
centered set of initiatives that would place greater responsibility for 
and participation in crime control on the shoulders of indigenous 
neighborhoods, with the extended family seen as a model for projects 
which reintegrate criminal youth into society and provide minority 
employment opportunity (pp. 205-19). 
What can be wrong with such a proposal? First, a major effort has 
been made within contemporary legal and criminal-justice scholarship 
to demonstrate the futility of such "back to basics" communitarian 
nostalgia as that evidenced by Curtis. Stanley Cohen in criminal jus-
tice17 and Richard Abel in the field of informalism and delegaliza-
17. S. COHEN, supra note 6, at 68-69: 
In the USA especially, a much more formalized type of enlistment of private citizens into 
police work has been taking place. Volunteer work such as driving cars, traffic control and 
escort services is provided to overloaded police forces, but more particularly there has been 
a formalization of neighbourhood surveillance and reporting systems: crime-stoppers 
groups, neighbourhood patrols, citizen crime-reporting projects, whistle-alert neigh-
bourhoods, citizen-band radio reporting, block-watch projects .... 
All these forms of policing appeal to the same community involvement vision which 
informs the destructuring movement as a whole. Once again though, new structures are 
being created rather than old ones being replaced. Nor can attempts to reproduce pre-urban 
systems of mutual responsibility, peacekeeping and good neighbourliness be very successful. 
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tion 18 provide just two examples of writers who have made such a 
strong case that one would expect Curtis to begin by rebutting the 
kind of arguments they make. 
Second, Curtis virtually ignores the critique set out by one of his 
own contributors, University of California (Berkeley) researcher Elli-
ott Currie, 19 which goes a long way toward demystifying the program-
matic conclusion to American Violence and Public Policy. "The 
danger in the notion of community crime prevention," asserts Currie, 
"is that it sometimes grants an almost mystical, idealized efficacy to an 
abstractly defined con1munity altogether detached from the larger, en-
vironing forces that, in fact, make or break living communities in the 
real world" (p. 58). That the "larger, environing forces" mentioned by 
Currie might include, for example, the nature of late-imperial, capital-
ist development is a theme to which we shall return in a moment. 
Finally, Curtis presents a dubious example of neighborhood reform 
designed to reduce the minority underclass: the House of Umoja 
Boy's Town in Philadelphia (pp. 206-10). Describing one aspect of 
Umoja's program, the Security Institute, Curtis cites the case of a for-
Citizens of today's suburbia or inner·city slum cannot through an effort of will recreate the 
conditions of an eighteenth-century rural parish. Closed·circuit television, two.way radios, 
vigilante patrols, private security companies and police decoys hardly simulate life in a pre· 
industrial village. 
18. 1-2 THE POLlTICS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE (R. Abel ed. 1982); Abel, De/egalization: A 
Critical Review of its Ideology, Manifestations and Social Consequences, 6 JAHRBUCH ZUR 
RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE UNO RECHTSTHEORIE 27 (1980). 
19. Elliott Currie's overview of contemporary American social thinking about criminal vio· 
lence is one of the most provocative essays in American Violence and Public Policy. It stands in 
an odd relationship to the volume's conclusion provided by the editor. Currie asserts, for exam-
ple, in a subsection entitled "Criminal Justice: Not the Solution," that "time has not been kind 
to the idea that much can be gained by way of crime reductions through the sheer expansion of 
criminal justice resources." P. 53. He goes on to criticize the notion that overhauls in police, 
courts, or neighborhood involvement could radically reduce violent crime. Pp. 54-60. Yet Lynn 
Curtis, in the book's conclusion, states: "Most volumes on policy against crime end with a 
phrase like, 'Of course, the criminal justice system cannot do the job alone.' The tone of this 
book has been more the opposite - that we should not downgrade the Violence Commission's 
concern for law and order .... " Pp. 219-20. It is not easy to reconcile the tone or emphasis of 
Curtis' views with those of Currie. For the reader more interested in Currie's approach than in 
that of Curtis, there is an immediate remedy. Late in 1985, Currie published his own full-scale 
treatment of criminal justice. See E. CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIME: AN AMERICAN CHAL· 
LENGE (1985). 
James Comer's discussion of black violence and public policy, pp. 63-86, and the Ball· 
Rokeach and Short essay on collective violence, see notes 39-53 infra and accompanying text, are 
both excellent and should find a large readership. Franklin Zimring's analysis of violence and 
firearms policy, pp. 133-52, is compelling, yet in the midst of congressional consideration of 
actually reducing existing federal handgun controls there seems to be little hope for any dramatic 
recognition of the need for tougher gun regulations, as Zimring acknowledges. P. 150. C. SIL· 
BERMAN, supra note 6, at 61, makes an important point, especially with reference to criminal 
violence in Miami and other cities involved in the illegal drug traffic: 
Although public discussion has focused on the so-called "Saturday night special" (a cheap, 
short-barreled .22 revolver), most of the guns confiscated by the police when they make 
arrests are expensive, high-quality weapons - handguns, such as the Colt and Smith & 
Wesson .38, and sawed-off shotguns and automatic rifles. 
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mer Umojan who learned private security work through the Institute 
and became a detective: 
The neighborhood shopping center is being patrolled by young men 
with Security Institute training. They wear Umoja uniforms, do not 
carry weapons, and serve as additional eyes and ears to protect the com-
munity. The street savvy of these young men is being tapped, not ig-
nored or blocked (as was the case in many federal employment programs 
of the 1960s and 1970s). They know what suspicious behaviors to watch 
for, and they use that knowledge to prevent crime. Umoja has contracts 
with a nearby shopping mall, a 7-Eleven, and a Burger King to help keep 
crime and fear down. That also encourages businesses to stay in the 
neighborhood. [pp. 207-08] 
Presumably these fast food special forces will have the street savvy 
to identify hungry little McBeggars going through the trash bins in :the 
parking lot as potential garbage thieves and perhaps even pick out the 
random psychotic with one too many machine guns under his arm 
trying to get through the turnstyle. But why does Curtis believe that 
young men trapped in the ghetto are likely to trade in a potentially 
lucrative, always daring, life of crime for a second class posting as 
unarmed security guard at Burger King? It is a wonder that so many 
people are able to spend eight hours a day in a fast food "restaurant" 
as it is. What Curtis produces is the material of a William S. Bur-
roughs novel about America at the end of its tether, not the substance 
of a serious critique of either the poverty programs of the 1960s or the 
crime control programs of the 1990s. Curtis concedes that the "resi-
dential setting for the Job Corps is rural" but suggests that these pro-
grams can be brought into the cities (p. 212) and made to work. 
Indeed, one Florida program took "hard-core delinquents" out into 
the Everglades, "surrounded by woods and creeks and swamps filled 
with alligators and snakes, wild hogs and mosquitoes," and then re-
turned them to Miami.20 But what do the "neighborhood and family" 
reformers plan to have these young men do for a living once they get 
back to the city? What attractive social opportunities are likely to 
come their way unless they replicate the lifestyles of the cool custom-
ers portrayed on the popular, prime-time television series, Miami 
Vice? 21 What real prospects do the graduates of Curtis' model pro-
20. D. MACGlLLIS & ABC NEWS, CRIME IN AMERICA: THE ABC REPORT 154 (1983) (the 
most ambitious, multi-segment television documentary on crime in America ever produced; com-
paring here the Everglades project, the House of Umoja in Philadelphia, and other milieu-ther-
apy programs). 
21. See C. SILBERMAN, supra note 6, at 89: 
[T]he cultural emphasis on success is greater now than it used to be: Every day of the week, 
in the films they see, the television programs they watch, and the public schools they attend, 
poor people are bombarded with messages about success - vivid images of the life style of 
the middle class. Television, in particular, drives home the idea that one is not a full-fledged 
American unless one can afford the goods and services portrayed in the commercials and in 
the programs themselves. To poor people, the TV screen provides a daily reminder, if any is 
needed, of the contrast between their own poverty and the affluence enjoyed by the rest of 
society. 
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grams have of becoming doctors or lawyers, pharmacists or teachers, 
engineers or architects, nurses or city planners? What chance do they 
have of getting perhaps less professionally glamorous but, nonetheless, 
high-paying ]obs in the new, upscale electronics or information indus-
tries? In other words, what picture of his future does the potential 
inner-city criminal have which competes with the attraction of crime? 
This is the sort of question a serious book about crime should have 
begun with. 22 
Ill. TERRORISM 
"We asked Robert Kupperman," suggests Curtis, "to write the 
preceding chapter because terrorism has emerged so dramatically 
since the Violence Commission" (p. 205). Considering how relatively 
few Americans have been kidnapped or physically harmed by ter-
rorists (pp. 184-87), it is not at all clear why "terrorism" alone has 
emerged sufficiently "dramatically" since the 1960s to require an addi-
tional chapter in a crime survey. I asked several criminal law teachers 
what one category of crime they would identify as having dramatically 
emerged since the Violence Commission and they all said the same 
thing: sexual abuse and violence directed against women and children 
by men. 23 This subject is not even remotely addressed by American 
Violence and Public Policy, and I do not think that feminists alone will 
be surprised and disturbed by the omission. 
When Sir Leon Radzinowicz and Marvin Wolfgang revised their 
earlier, three-part study of "The Criminal In The Arms Of The Law," 
See also J. FISKE & J. HARTLEY, READING TELEVISION (1978); TELEVISION: THE CRITICAL 
VIEW (H. Newcomb ed. 1982); POPULAR TELEVISION AND FILM (T. Bennett, s. Boyd-Bowman, 
c. Mercer & J. Woollacott eds. 1981); INTERPRETING TELEVISION: CURRENT RESEARCH PER· 
SPECTIVES (W. Rowland & B. Watkins eds. 1984); T. GITLIN, INSIDE PRIME TIME (1983). 
22. c. SILBERMAN, supra note 6, at 110: 
One need not postulate an autonomous "culture of poverty" to understand why the inci-
dence of violence is higher among the lower than among the middle class. Poor people 
accept the norms and values of American society. If they do not always act in accordance 
with those norms, if they follow a life style that includes a good deal of criminal violence, it 
is mainly because the circumstances of their lives make it difficult or impossible for them to 
do otherwise. As the sociologist Hylan Lewis puts it, the poor are "frustrated victims of 
middle class values." 
This is not an uncontroversial theory, yet Silberman argues it with considerable persuasiveness. 
See also M. MARABLE, The Cultural Dialectics Of Violence, in FROM THE GRASSROOTS: EssAYS 
TOWARDS AFRO-AMERICAN LIBERATION 93-110 (1980). 
23. See, e.g .• s. AGETON, SEXUAL AssAULT AMONG ADOLESCENTS (1983); s. BROWNMIL· 
LER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975); J. COSTA, ABUSE OF WOMEN: 
LEGISLATION, REPORTING, AND PREVENTION (1983); J. COSTA & G. NELSON, CHILD ABUSE 
AND NEGLECT: LEGISLATION, REPORTING, AND PREVENTION (1978); J. FLEMING, STOPPING 
WIFE ABUSE: A GUIDE TO THE EMOTIONAL, PSYCHOLOGICAL, AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 
FOR THE ABUSED WOMAN AND THOSE HELPING HER (1979). Whatever the actual statistics 
(which may be even worse than they appear as a result of "underreporting"), the public concem 
over these questions has emerged dramatically in the last decade, certainly since the 1960s.j 
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they added a fourth part on torture.24 It is interesting that they would 
see this subject as deserving addition to their previous work whereas 
Curtis felt that terrorism was the one subject which needed to be ad-
ded to the Violence Commission's list. It can be argued that relatively 
few Americans have been tortured during the past decade or so,25 yet 
the importance of an analysis of torture may derive from the relation-
ship of the American state to regimes which do practice torture as a 
systematic governmental policy.26 At the same time, of course, analy-
sis of terrorism could be justified on similar grounds of American in-
volvement with state terrorism and support for regimes which deploy 
terror. 
But Robert Kupperman begins by saying, "This chapter deals with 
subnational terrorism, not governmental terrorism" (p. 183). This is 
unfortunate since "subnational" terror - acts of terrorism by individ-
uals or groups smaller than and independent from governments - has 
cost thousands of lives fewer than has governmental or state terror and 
is thus infinitely less significant as a form of crime. 27 We quickly 
learn, however, that Kupperman is more interested in state terrorism 
24. See 2 CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra note 6, at 219-48; see also F. FANON, THE WRETCHED 
OF THE EARTH (1968); E. PETERS, TORTURE (1985). 
25. Here I am referring, of course, to persons tortured by the police or the military as op-
posed to victims of private crimes involving mayhem or sexual torture who appear, if the focus of 
a sensationalistic media is any indicator, to have become grotesquely commonplace casualties of 
modern living. 
26. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, TORTURE IN THE EIGHTIES: AN AMNESTY IN-
TERNATIONAL REPORT (1984). 
27. See Piccone & Zaslavsky, Introduction: Special Issue On Terror and State Terrorism, 54 
TELOS 2, 2 (1982): 
People who find themselves in a more comfortable relation to the state have different views. 
Jean Kirkpatrick, [former] U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, has recently drawn a 
much more sanguine conclusion about state terrorism: "Coercion exercised by governments 
was judged more harshly than the violence of terrorists despite the historic view that, by 
virtue of their responsibility for maintaining order, government possesses a monopoly of 
legitimate force. Treating governments and terrorists as equals deprives the former of all 
claims to legitimacy." Be that as it may, if one compares the number of victims and the 
amount of suffering generated by individuals or groups on the one hand, to that generated 
by governments on the other, one cannot avoid paying immensely more attention to state 
terrorism, while putting aside apologies of apparatchiki or equivalent Western functionaries. 
See also one of the most extensive legal treatises on terrorism, 3 R. FRIEDLANDER, TERRORISM: 
DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL AND LoCAL CONTROL vii (1981) (emphasis added): 
Individual and group terror - violence of a domestic nature, particularly in Spain, Italy, 
Central America, France, and Northern Ireland, has been escalating at a dangerous 
pace .... Government initiated or regime sponsored terror-violence has become common-
place in the contemporary world, as symbolized by the manipulated young Iranian militants 
who held U.S. diplomatic personnel hostage for 444 days and by the Latin American Death 
Squads operating in Brazil, Uruguay, Argentina, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Victims of 
state-encouraged right-wing terror have numbered in the tens of thousands . ... 
Imagine if tens of thousands of people were killed by "subnational" terrorist groups like the Irish 
Republican Army, the Baader-Meinhof Gang, the Jewish Defense League, Puerto Rican libera-
tion activists, the Red Brigades, Armenian or Croatian liberation fighters, or the Weathermen (or 
Weatherpeople) in countries such as the United States, Italy, Spain, France, Great Britain, or 
Germany. Even Kupperman's paranoia cannot project a realistic image of such an occurrence. 
Yet this has been happening for years in the countries of Latin America listed by Friedlander 
where the United States' right-wing client regimes have a free hand in such matters. There 
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than he has let on; he soon launches into an analysis of governments 
engaged in 
actively promoting and supporting terrorists with money, arms, or train-
ing. The list of nations that are now or have recently been involved in 
supporting terrorism includes Libya, Cuba, the Soviet Union, China, 
North Korea, Algeria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen 
(Aden), Tanzania, Congo, Zaire, Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Lebanon. [pp. 
193-94] 
The absence of right-wing dictatorships,28 and the United States,29 
simply is no comparison between the criminality of "subnational" and state terrorists. Kup· 
pennan does not even acknowledge that his choice might seem odd. 
Even beyond this, the section of American Violence and Public Policy in which Kuppennan 
writes is titled "Political Violence," p. 181, yet neither Kuppennan nor Curtis provide any expla· 
nation whatsoever as to why they regard the subject of American political violence since the 
1960s exhausted by a discussion of a subject as marginal to most Americans as terrorism. 
America's secret and illegal bombing of Cambodia begun in 1969 apparently was, for Kup· 
pennan and Curtis, merely a "sideshow" to the real danger: unspecified "Libyan Groups in [the] 
United States" and "Concerned Sierra Leone Nationals." P. 186. More people were kilted by 
the American bombing of Cambodia than by all subnational terrorists operating in the United 
States since the violence commissions made their reports in the 1960s. See S. HERSH, THE PRICE 
OF POWER: KISSINGER IN THE NIXON WHITE HOUSE (1983); W. SHAWCROSS, SIDESHOW: 
KISSINGER, NIXON AND THE DESTRUCTION OF CAMBODIA (1979). For a view of "political 
violence" superior to that ofKuppennan and Curtis, see J. ROEBUCK & S. WEEBER, POLITICAL 
CRIME IN THE UNITED STATES: ANALYZING CRIME BY AND AGAINST GOVERNMENT (1978). 
28. See, e.g., LeMoyne, New Army Slayings In Guatemala Reported by Villagers and Clmrclt, 
N.Y. Times, July 28, 1985, at 1, col. 2: 
At least 60 Indian peasants living in and around this small town have been kilted or have 
"disappeared" in the last seven months, almost all of them victims of the Guatemalan 
Anny, according to local residents and the Archbishop of Guatemala .... According to the 
Church report, the Government-directed violence, apparently intended to eliminate anyone 
suspected of even sympathizing with leftist rebels, has left at least 146 orphans and 45 wid· 
ows in this village alone. "The army kills many people, up to children," the Archbishop of 
Guatemala, Prospero Penados de! Barrio, said in an interview. "There are many dead." 
Guatemala is typical of the kind of American client state excluded from Kuppennan's list of 
governments which support terrorism. He nowhere discusses his method of including states 
whose political or economic systems the United States opposes while excluding states whose vecy 
terrorism often advances American foreign policy goals. See P. LERNOUX, CRY OF THE PEOPLE 
(1982); Nairn, Behind The Death Squads, PROGRESSIVE, May 1984, at 1; Petras & Morley, Anti· 
Communism In Guatemala: Washington's Alliance With Generals and Death Squads, in THE 
SOCIALIST REGISTER, 1984, at 261-77 (1984). 
29. See, e.g., J. BECKET, BARBARISM IN GREECE (1970); N. CHOMSKY & E. HERMAN, THE 
WASHINGTON CONNECTION AND THIRD WORLD FASCISM (1979); ALLEGED ASSASSINATION 
PLOTS INVOLVING FOREIGN LEADERS (F. Church intro. 1976); M. FARHANG, U.S. IMPERIAL-
ISM: FROM THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR To THE IRANIAN REVOLUTION (R. Falk intro. 
1981); E. HERMAN, THE REAL TERROR NETWORK: TERRORISM IN FACT AND PROPAGANDA 
(1982); M. KLARE & C. ARNSON, SUPPLYING REPRESSION: U.S. SUPPORT FOR AUTHORITA-
RIAN REGIMES ABROAD (1981); T. PLATE & A. DARVI, SECRET POLICE (1981). 
For a recent reported incident of terrorist acts carried out by American-backed cadres, see 
White, U.S. Linked To Counter-Terrorist Blast, Manchester Guardian Weekly, May 19, 1985, at 
1, col. 1 (Wash. Post reprint ed.): 
[In] a move consistent with the Administration's public rhetoric in favour of "pre-emptive 
self-defence" against world wide terrorism, [the Reagan administration approved] a CIA 
training programme for Lebanese groups capable of making their own "counter terrorist" 
strikes [of which] [t]he outcome was a car bomb attack, apparently intended to kill a promi-
nent Shi'ite suspect, Mr. Mohammed Hussein Fadlallah, which missed him but killed 80 
and wounded 200 in Beirut in March [1985]. 
See also Brummer, Wlzy The CIA Primed The Blast Of Terror, Manchester Guardian Weekly, 
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from the list of countries that practice terrorism rapidly communicates 
to the reader everything that he or she needs to know about Kup-
perman's likely contribution to our knowledge of American violence 
and public policy. Substituting partisan ideology for partisan scholar-
ship, Kupperman reveals himself to be a member of the Claire Sterling 
school of world conspiracy theory30 which, to paraphrase Lynn Cur-
tis, "has never seen a cause of terrorism" except, perhaps, in the per-
fidy of Bulgarian or Russian intelligence operatives. As far as Curtis is 
concerned, James Baldwin's sense of rage at oppression is only worth 
recognition in the case of American minorities or oppressed groups.31 
To take just one example, the Irish Republican Army (mentioned 
by Kupperman at p. 184) may well represent as vicious a "subna-
tional" terrorist group as exists in the world. But even the IRA's most 
severe critics, like Coner Cruise O'Brien32 and Edward Moxon-
Browne, 33 realize that terrorists like those of the IRA cannot be 
stopped until the underlying causes of their conduct have been recog-
nized and dealt with. 34 Much of this will be obvious to most readers 
May 26, 1985, at 8, col. 1 (Wash. Post reprint ed.); R. WRIGHT, SACRED RAGE: THE CRUSADE 
OF MODERN ISLAM 90-97 (1985); Cohen, Terrorism: The Mirror Image, Manchester Guardian 
Weekly, July 21, 1985, at 15, col. 3 (Wash. Post reprint ed.): "Hold the policy papers and 
suspend all meetings on terrorism. What this administration needs is not a new policy, not better 
intelligence and certainly not more street-comer rhetoric, but a good full-length mirror. It just 
might see a hypocrite there." Would that Mr. Cohen's advice, offered in the wake of a Lebanese 
terrorist hijacking of an American airliner and directed at the Reagan administration, had been 
offered to Mr. Kupperman by his editor before he submitted the draft of his essay on terrorism. 
30. See c. STERLING, THE TERROR NETWORK: THE SECRET WAR OF INTERNATIONAL 
TERRORISM (1981) (see note 34 infra). Kupperman's bibliography, which includes Ms. Sterling's 
adventuresome narrative, and is jammed with titles from the Rand Corporation, the American 
Enterprise Institute, a publication called Enterprise: The Journal of Executive Action, the Hoover 
Institution, the American Council for World Freedom, Arlington House, and, of course, the 
CIA, perfectly reflects the mentality which shapes his research and argument: the technocratic 
stridency of world counter-insurgency, the less haute bourgeois (Kupperman is at Georgetown 
University) formulation of which appears regularly in the pages of Soldier Of Fortune, which is 
sold in 7-Elevens and late-night beer drive-ins across the country. Pp. 201-02. For an excellent 
critique of Kupperman, Sterling & Co., see Cockburn, The Gospel According To Ali Agca, 241 
NATION 1 (1985). For complex and enlightening analyses of the technocratic mentality within 
America's intellectual power elite, see F. KAPLAN, THE WIZARDS OF ARMAGEDDON (1983); W. 
McDOUGALL, ... THE HEAVENS AND THE EARTH: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE SPACE 
AGE 8 (1985): "Foreign political and domestic social challenges, it was believed, were equally 
susceptible to the technological and managerial fix: revolutionary change without revolution, 
qualitative problems solved with quantitative methods. Under the impact of total Cold War, 
technocracy came to America." Unfortunately, Kupperman's essay is not the only part of Cur-
tis' book to which this critique applies. 
31. See text following note 16 supra. 
32. O'Brien, Terrorism Under Democratic Conditions: The Case Of the IRA, in TERRORISM, 
LEGITIMACY, AND POWER: THE CONSEQUENCES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE 91 (M. Crenshaw 
ed. 1983) [hereinafter cited as O'Brien, Terrorism]; see also C.C. O'BRIEN, HEROD: REFLEC-
TIONS ON POLITICAL VIOLENCE (1978). 
33. Maxon-Browne, Terrorism in Northern Ireland: The Case of the Provisional IRA, in TER-
RORISM: A CHALLENGE TO THE STATE 146 (J. Lodge ed. 1981). 
34. See, e.g., O'Brien, Terrorism, supra note 32, at 102: 
All my emphasis has been laid on the indigenous reasons for the durability of the war. I 
have not discussed the hypothesis suggested by Claire Sterling and others, including a few in 
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and, as previously indicated, American Violence And Public Policy is 
apparently premised on an assumption that Kupperman's analysis ef-
fectively contradicts: that the first step in confronting crime is trying 
to understand its causes. So how did Kupperman end up being chosen 
to make the one contribution in a new category of crime explored in 
this update? Serious scholars define terrorism rigorously, stick to their 
definition, and do not play ideological favorites. But any list of ter-
rorists which includes only members of one race or religion, or any list 
of states involved in terrorism that includes only those of one world 
ideological constellation, seems to me likely to be the work of the fa-
natic pamphleteer or the politician working the crowd, not the kind of 
scholarship for which Yale University Press usually strives. 35 
What is most disturbing is that Curtis specifically endorses Kup-
perman's views: "A democracy must debate the issues underlying a 
terrorist attack but cannot be blackmailed by the planned violence of 
trained professionals. That is why Kupperman's tough policies are in 
order" (p. 220). Yet that is exactly the neo-conservative position on 
violent street crime to which Curtis is supposed to be providing an 
alternative: you can talk all you want about poverty, child abuse, and 
other so-called "causes" of crime, but when you finally become the 
victim of these drugged-up street thugs who have no respect for any-
thing, then you too will recognize that violence and prison are the only 
things that will stop them. 36 
Northern Ireland, that the IRA functions as part of an international conspiracy. I believe 
that hypothesis to be fanciful and misleading .... [B]asically [the IRA] is an outgrowth qf 
the deep-rooted ultranationalist physical-force tradition within the Irish Catholic (and na-
tionalist) community. It is a thoroughly and bitterly native phenomenon, and no one who 
has studied it_ closely believes in the reality, or even the possibility, of its falling under for-
eign control. 
See also Moxon-Browne, supra note 33, at 161: 
The [IRA] guerrilla fish do have the water they need to survive. The "water" consists of a 
proportion of the Catholic population that feels that it does not receive a "fair deal" in the 
Northern Ireland of today. Such a "fair deal" would consist of both tangibles and in-
tangibles ranging from a notion of ''justice" at one extreme to jobs, houses and leisure amen-
ities, at the other. The role of the [Provisional IRA] has been to capitalise on these 
perceptions of injustice and link them to a broader struggle. 
In the wake of American threats with respect to a "get tough" policy on villages in Lebanon's 
Bekaa Valley that provide aid and comfort to Shi'a terrorists, it is interesting to observe just how 
broad the waters of support for the IRA actually are: 
In a fit of bad temper Mrs. Thatcher could wake up one day and decide that she is tired if 
[sic] waiting for Washington to offend the Irish vote by putting the IRA's financial accom-
plices out of business - she could have the RAF make a surgical strike against Noraid 
offices in Brooklyn. 
In America, Counter-Insurgency Has Been Privatised, Manchester Guardian Weekly, July 14, 
1985, at 8, col. 1 (Wash. Post reprint ed.). 
35. For the reader who doubts the possibility of the sort of balanced and consistent analysis I 
outline when the field of research is as emotionally and ideologically charged as that of terrorism 
and. its causes, I recommend Robin Wright's excellent book on Islamic Jihad, supra note 29. 
36. The best general critiques of neo-conservativism in criminal justice theory are found in S. 
COHEN, supra note 6, and E. CURRIE, CONFRONTING CRIME: AN AMERICAN CHALLENGE 22-
50 (1985). For a critique of neo-conservative attitudes that stresses their avoidance of socioeco-
nomic and historical causation, see Habermas, Neoconservative Culture Criticism in the United 
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Ultimately, then, what is important about Kupperman's analysis 
of terrorism is what it reveals about Curtis' perception of crime con-
trol. A more conservative, "surveillance and punish"37 reading of 
Curtis' community self-defense strategies seems indicated. "At its 
worst," comments Currie, "[community crime prevention] can degen-
erate into a kind of pulling-the-wagons-in-a-circle mentality ... " (p. 
58). It would be difficult to find a better description of Kupperman's 
politics of anxiety.Js 
IV. COLLECTIVE VIOLENCE 
Perhaps the most important way of relating the work of Porter and 
Dunn on the Miami Riot of 1980 to that of Sandra Ball-Rokeach and 
James Short39 on collective violence in American Violence and Public 
Policy would be to situate the specific approach of each author in rela-
tion to methodologies of riot classification and interpretation devel-
oped during the past twenty years of theorizing about racial violence 
in the United States.40 But such a comparison is too ambitious for this 
States and West Germany: An Intellectual Movement in Two Political Cultures, 56 TELOS 75 
(1983); for an excellent illustration of the neo-conservative superficiality in treating the relation 
between poverty, race, and crime, see the inept review of Silberman's book (among others) in 
Kelley, Stalking The Criminal Mind, HARPER'S, Aug. 1985, at 53. · 
37. See M. FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON (1975), and 
the discussion of Foucault's work in S. COHEN, supra note 6. 
38. The most telling examples of what the terrorist threat can mean to American safety 
offered by Kupperman are the Tylenol poisonings of 1982 and the "terrorism theater" of Pales-
tinians poisoning "a handful" of Israeli Jaffa oranges en route to America (pp. 191-92). Never-
theless, by early 1986, media hype had built anticipation of the arrival of unspecified Middle 
Eastern hit squads on American streets to the point that it seemed that the security managers 
would almost be disappointed (certainly less well employed) if terrorism did not come to the 
United States from abroad. Kupperman's "expertise" disintegrates when confronted with real 
world examples of the politics of terrorism such as that of the 1985 hijacking of TWA's flight 
from Athens to Rome. Interviewed on the Cable News Network by Bernard Shaw on June 30, 
1985, Kupperman was asked whether he agreed with one of the American hostages who sug-
gested the United States should at least think about the causes of anti-American political vio-
lence. Kupperman replied that it was a statement impossible to disagree with but dismissed 
analysis of causes with the observation that the causes of social unrest would be around long after 
he was gone. Interviewed on the Cable News Network program "Crossfire" on July 1, 1985, 
Kupperman suggested that after identifying who hijacked the TWA plane, we should "find them 
and kill them." One of the problems with killing people you think are guilty of crimes without 
first trying them is pointed out in Ottaway, Sheik's Involvement Never Proved, Manchester 
Guardian Weekly, May 26, 1985, at 15, col. 3 (Wash. Post reprint ed.) (What if it turns out you 
killed the wrong people?). Why this problem does not represent a major concern for Kupperman 
is dealt with in Cockburn, supra note 30, at 7. Even if the White House is relocated inside a 
bunker, "pulling-in-the-wagons" is not an answer to terrorism. See R. WRIGHT, supra note 29; 
Keeping One's Head About Colonel Gadafy, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Jan. 12, 1986, at 1, 
col. 1 (Wash. Post reprint ed.). 
39. Ball-Rokeach & Short, Collective Violence: The Redress of Grievance and Public Policy, 
in Curtis, pp. 155-80. 
40. See, e.g., L. WILLIAMS & L. WILLIAMS II, ANATOMY OF FOUR RACE RIOTS: RACIAL 
CONFLICT IN KNOXVILLE, ELAINE (ARKANSAS), TULSA AND CHICAGO, 1919-1921 (1972); S. 
ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND: THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921 (1982); D. 
CAPECI, JR., THE HARLEM RIOT OF 1943 (1977); R.M. BROWN, STRAIN OF VIOLENCE: HIS-
TORICAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN VIOLENCE AND VIGILANTISM (1975); VIOLENCE IN AMERICA: 
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brief review, and thus I will focus instead upon what these and several 
other writers have said in common about the lessons we might learn 
from the racial confrontation that rocked the "Magic City" just six 
years ago. 
1. Ball-Rokeach and Short review the conclusions and recom-
mendations of the 1960s violence and crime reports with regard to 
collective violence and underline what was original about them; for 
example, the Kerner report's diagnosis of "institutionalized racism" 
(pp. 156-59). They suggest that the social conditions that were per-
ceived from the vantage point of the 1960s as primary causes of collec-
tive violence have remained static or grown worse for most blacks and 
other poor people over the last twenty years.41 Why, then, the virtual 
disappearance of major urban uprisings in the 1970s and 1980s? Ball-
Rokeach and Short argue that a combination of heavy investment in 
one of the 1960s reports' proposals (beefing up the arsenal of law en-
forcement), plus declining expectations that the increased risks jn-
volved in rioting would lead to any sort of positive social or 
governmental response, tipped the scales among those at the bottom of 
the social order in favor of despondency and immobilization, espe-
cially when confronted with a vigorous counter-riot of the rich under 
generally conservative Republican regimes in Washington.42 
But why, then, the Miami Riot of 1980? The riot was the result of 
HISTORICAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES (H. Graham & T. Gurr eds. 1969); A. HALEY 
& MALCOLM X, THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (1964); A. WASKOW, FROM RACE 
RIOT TO SIT-IN; 1919 AND THE 1960s: A STUDY IN THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN CONFLICT 
AND VIOLENCE (1966); J.H. FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF NEGRO 
AMERICANS (3d ed. 1967); I. BALBUS, THE DIALECTICS OF LEGAL REPRESSION: BtiACK 
REBELS BEFORE THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL COURTS (1977). Balbus' study is particularly im-
portant because it synthesizes the concrete detail of 1960s riots in Los Angeles, Detroit, and 
Chicago with a political theory of race and class in American society. 
41. Pp. 159-69. Beyond the argument cited by Ball-Rokeach and Short, see T.B. EDSALL, 
THE NEW POLITICS OF INEQUALITY (1984); Davis, The Political Economy of Late-Imperial 
America, NEW LEFT REV., Jan.-Feb., 1984, at 6, 18: 
First, the "victory" in the War on Poverty is largely an artefact of income transfers within 
the working class which leave structural employment situations intact. Begin to remove 
these federal income supports, as Reagan has recently started to do, and the original 1960-
level of designated poverty reappears. In fact, the pre-transfer inequality of market incomes 
has increased in the past generation .... The American economy has especially failed to re-
integrate black male workers, whose participation rate in the labour-force (a key index of 
structural unemployment) has fallen from 80% in 1945 to barely 60% today. 
Davis' argument that the civil rights movement and the war on poverty legislation failed to 
overcome the structural impediments built into late-imperial capitalist economic development in 
the United States is, of course, radically different from the assertion, made by Charles Murray 
and shared by fellow neo-conservatives George Gilder and Thomas Sowell, that federal programs 
designed to help the poor have actually made them worse off. For systematic criticism of the 
latter argument, see Jencks, How Poor Are the Poor?, NEW YORK REV. BooKs, May 9, 1985, at 
41. 
42. Pp. 165-67. For the position that rising expectations contributed to the civil disturbances 
of the 1960s and that black collective action (including collective violence) did lead to social 
gains for minorities, see D. NEWMAN, supra note 7, at 20-21; J. COHEN & J. ROGERS, ON DE-
MOCRACY 112 (1983); F.F. PIVEN & R. CLOWARD, PoOR PEOPLE'S MoVEMENTS: WHY THEY 
SUCCEED, How THEY FAIL 272-73 (1977). For an analysis of the "vigorous counter-riot of the 
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poverty-stricken Miami blacks hitting bottom, a flash point at the op-
posite end (in a sense) of one social-psychological spectrum whose 
other terminus (hope for change, prospects of being socially integrated 
through employment and educational opportunities) had itself been a 
spur to civil disturbances in the period two decades earlier. It was in 
the middle ground of this dialectical field of violence where the right 
ingredients for revolt were missing (pp. 168-71). And, of course, in 
Miami Arthur McDuffie had been beaten to death by police officers 
who escaped criminal sanction (pp. 169-70). Thus the combination of 
a disturbing, downward economic trajectory for Miami's large black 
population with specific incidents of perceived police brutality precipi-
tated an almost "third world" riot of despair: I 
[T]he cause of the Liberty City-Miami riot was more fundamentally 
due to a transformation of the Miami black community into an under-
class. David Whitman, senior research assistant at Harvard University's 
Kennedy School of Government, contends that the most important con-
dition giving rise to the Miami riot was the fact that, while economic 
prosperity was being experienced by whites and many Hispanics, a large 
proportion of the city's blacks had been relegated to an underclass of 
unemployables with little hope of escaping the dependency wrought by 
their structural irrelevance. 43 
rich" as a kind of backlash against the social gains made by the poor in the 1960s, see Davis, 
supra note 41, at 35: 
Although the rhetoric of the various campaigns and tax rebellions that paved Reagan's road 
to power was vigorously anti-statist, the real programmatic intention was towards a restruc-
turing, rather than diminution, of state spending and intervention in order to expand the 
frontiers of entrepreneurial and rentier opportunity .... All these modalities of professional, 
entrepreneurial and rentier claims on society presume, of course, the high and sustained rate 
of economic expansion typified by Sunbelt urbanization over the past few decades. 
See also T.B. EDSALL, supra note 41, who argues that during the past two decades, the profes-
sional and business interests indicated by Davis have virtually taken over both national political 
parties: 
Within the Democratic party, campaign fundraising, party rules, and the emergence of a 
dominant reform wing during the post-Watergate period have resulted in a disproportionate 
share of power going to an upper-middle-class, professional, highly educated, and relatively 
affluent elite .... At the top of the [Republican] party, however, an alliance of conservative 
ideological leaders, corporate chief executive officers, sunbelt entrepreneurs, independent 
oilmen, and key representatives of Washington's business lobbying community has been 
gaining a broad and legitimate claim to power. 
Id. at 67-68. In short, most non-union-organized working Americans, the unemployed, and par-
ticularly the black underclass find themselves closed out of the national political parties. The 
subordination of the poor and racial minorities over the past twenty years has been the necessary 
result of what Davis describes as the "Watts riot of the middle classes,'' Davis, supra note 41, at 
33, a riot to be sure without any urgent government study commissions. 
43. Pp. 170-71 (emphasis added); see also K. AULETTA, THE UNDERCLASS 46-47 (1982): 
Many ghetto residents feel cut off, isolated. Some lose hope. And, as witnessed in Miami's 
riots, some lose fear. Angry at police brutality or Cubans or unemployment or the system or 
whitey, or just bored with hanging out, these enraged individuals turn to senseless and wan-
ton destruction .... Many of those participating in the Miami riot ... "were not poor or 
unemployed or members of the criminal class." All were united by their rage. According to 
Dunn and Porter, they were protesting. But others would emphasize, as Eleanor Norton and 
Patricia Harris did in another context, that the value system of the underclass may have 
become the pervasive one in the Miami ghetto. 
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2. As suggested in the initial section of this review, a major pur-
pose of the Porter and Dunn volume is simply to set out the events 
leading up to and constituting the Miami Riot of 1980 in the kind of 
detail essential to a full understanding of the ferocity of skirmishes 
along the borderland of what may have, in fact, become America's 
"Gulag."44 Yet Porter and Dunn also spend considerable time evalu-
ating the causes of the riot and its social texture. Like Ball-Rokeach 
44. Ball-Rokeach and Short suggest that 
[ o ]fall the recommendations made by the Violence, Kerner, and Katzenbach reports, those 
concerning the beefing up of the arsenal and size of law enforcement agencies received the 
most extensive financial and political support. None of these commissions envisioned reli-
ance upon technological and strategic preparations that would "gulag" the ghetto by using 
fear to suppress collective protest. 
P. 165. Yet that may well be what has happened. After sketching out the "gulag" future faced 
by Amercia's cities, of which the 1960s crime reports warned if we did not attend to questions of 
social justice, Currie adds: 
[W]hat most strikes me today about the commission's scenario is that, with some exceptions, 
it came true to such an extent that we now simply take most of it for granted .••• I was 
struck by this during a recent foray into the newly "revitalized" downtown area of a large, 
high-crime western city that shall remain nameless. The high-rise buildings were there, all 
right. Most of them seemed, indeed, to be banks; they gleamed and glittered and fairly 
oozed urban prosperity. But the guards were there, too - inside the buildings, in the lob-
bies and in the elevators; outside the buildings, in the parking garages (imagine the commis-
sion, in 1969, thinking it worthy of note that downtown visitors would insist on protected 
parking!) and in the immaculate, if mainly deserted, plaza between the buildings. 
P. 42. And as Carl Abbott describes it, 
Downtown Atlanta rises above its surrounding city like a walled fortress from another age. 
The citadel is anchored to the south by the international trade centre and buttressed by the 
municipal stadium .... The sunken moat of I-85 with its flowing lanes of traffic reaches 
around the eastern base of the hill from south to north, protecting lawyers, bankers, consul-
tants, and regional executives from the intrusion of low-income neighborhoods. 
c. ABBOTI, THE NEW URBAN AMERICA 143 (1983), quoted in Davis, Urban Renaissance and 
the Spirit of Postmodemism, 151 NEW LEFT REV., May-June 1985, at 106. Davis adds: "It is 
not surprising that Los Angeles's Portman-built new downtown (like that of Detroit, or Hous-
ton) reproduces more or less exactly the beseiged landscape of [Atlanta's] Peachtree Center. , •• 
In fact, Portman has only built large vivariums for the upper middle classes, protected by aston-
ishingly complex security systems." Davis, supra, at 106. Matching, however, the grand masters 
of contemporary medievalism stroke for stroke, the modern barbarians have waded out into the 
"sunken moat" of I-95 in Dade County, Florida, cudgels in hand; see Buchanan, Modem High-
way Robbers Bedevil Motorists On 1-95, Miami Herald, July 28, 1985, at IA, col. 1: 
The robberies usually take three forms: attacks on stranded motorists; assaults on cars 
trapped in bumper-to-bumper traffic; and attacks by holdup men who stop cars by hurling 
objects into the roadway. They throw tire rims, street barricades, nails, sometimes even oil 
drums .... In a pattern that emerged last month, men with guns hurled debris onto the 
ramp from State Road 836 to northbound I-95 at night, between 9:30 and 11:30 p.m. Cars 
are disabled, the occupants left helpless ..•. John S. Sherman, the mayor of Bal Harbour, 
complained to Gov. Bob Graham about the fences after two of his constituents, riding in a 
Rolls-Royce, were ambushed on I-95 on a sunny Saturday afternoon last month. Outraged, 
he asked for higher fences, emergency call boxes and more police patrol. . 
See also Buchanan, The Robbers: Crooks Hit and Run, Then Get Off Lightly, Miami Herald, July 
28, 1985, at 20A, col. 1: 
Profile of Miami's I-95 highway robbers: wiry, slightly built, black, youthful, and unem· 
ployed .... [A]ll the robberies occurred on stretches of expressway bordered by black neigh-
borhoods. "A white robber isn't going to hang out there to commit a crime," says Sally 
Heyman, a crime prevention coordinator. Often the attackers are juveniles .•.. Then there 
was a motorist, unidentified, who did not stop. When police arrested the 15-year-old several 
days later, they noticed an unusual marking on his arm. It was the mark of Michelin - a 
tire track, said Broussard. 
See also The Victim: Assaulted Motorist Feels Like A Number, Miami Herald, July 28, 1985, at 
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and Short, they point out the differences between the 1980 riot and 
those of the 1960s, although Porter and Dunn emphasize - in addi-
tion to the contrast between riots of expectation and disillusion - the 
disparity between earlier riots where police alone were white targets of 
black violence and the Miami Riot where white civilians suddenly be-
came fair game (Porter & Dunn, pp. 172-79). Comparatively speak-
ing, it was when black violence finally moved close to the fringe of 
previously untouched white suburban areas that the South African 
government (in the name of protecting blacks from blacks) declared an 
official "state of emergency" during the summer of 1985, the first time 
it had done so since the aftermath of the Sharpeville Massacre of 
1960.45 
"To find prior incidents where blacks attacked and killed whites" 
in the U.S., according to Porter and Dunn, "one would have to look 
back to the race riots following World War I that occurred in East St. 
Louis, Chicago, and other cities .... Prior to the World War I disor-
ders, there is no precedent to blacks killing whites unless one goes all 
the way to the sporadic slave rebellions that occurred before the Civil 
War."46 In at least one respect, we may indeed have gotten back to 
"slavery days": the disappearance of lower-income Americans (in-
20A, col. 5; Buchanan, Bump the Bandit I/There's Danger, Experts Suggest, Miami Herald, July 
28, 1985, at 20A, col. 5. 
45. See A. SACHS, JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 216-18 (1973); L. KUPER, GENOCIDE 197-204 
(1981); Naude, supra note 14. 
46. P. 177. On a somewhat less ambitious note, however, the authors observe that 
[s]ome of the antiwhite violence in Miami can be attributed simply to geography. Sixty-
second Street in Liberty City, Grand Avenue in Coconut Grove and other streets in the 
ghetto are major north-south or east-west thoroughfares, used as much by whites as by 
blacks. And unlike Watts, Newark and Detroit, where the riots built slowly and whites had 
at least some warning to stay clear, in Miami many whites found themselves caught in the 
middle of a riot that suddenly erupted all around them. 
P. 176. Add the fact that even whites who expected a riot upon not-guilty verdicts in the Mc-
Duffie murder trial were caught off guard by the three-hour, weekend acquittal and I think you 
have found more sober reasons for the degree of antiwhite violence in Miami than looking to a 
comparison with early slave rebellions for an explanation. 
The unusual proximity of very wealthy whites and very poor blacks in some parts of residen-
tial Miami may have reproduced the racially mixed neighborhood patterns more characteristic of 
urban America at the time of the World War I-era race riots. A growing physical distance 
separating the races has been one marked development of twentieth-century housing trends in 
large cities with substantial minority populations and may have contributed to the limited 
number of nonpolice whites killed in urban race riots during the 1940s and 1960s. See J. 
KUSHNER, APARTHEID IN AMERICA 1-3 (1980): "In 1961, the United States Commission on 
Civil Rights described the exodus of Whites to the suburbs and the resulting entrapment of 
Blacks and other minorities in the central cities as the 'white noose.' " The number of U.S. 
blacks living in racially mixed neighborhoods declined rapidly after the Second World War. Id. 
at 3; see also J. JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 72 (1961): "On 
one plane, for instance, an acquaintance there comments that although she has lived in [Los 
Angeles] for ten years and knows it contains Mexicans, she has never laid eyes on a Mexican or 
an item of Mexican culture, much less ever exchanged any words with a Mexican.'' 
There are other parallels between the Miami Riot of 1980 and some of the World War I-era 
civil disturbances; compare, for example, the comments by T. Willard Fair, president of the 
Miami Urban League, Porter & Dunn, p. 109, with those of black historian John Hope Franklin, 
Introduction to S. ELLSWORTH, supra note 40, at xvi-xvii (both men underscoring the disturbing 
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eluding blacks) from the voting booths and electoral rolls has repro-
duced some features of nineteenth-century, pre-democratic liberalism. 
As many commentators have recently pointed out, 47 heavy voter ab-
stention among the lower classes has resulted in an electorate signifi-
cantly more middle class than the population at large. In the specific 
case of Miami's black underclass, Porter and Dunn demonstrate that 
political and economic clout has become so marginal that it is reason-
able to ask whether archaic property or race disabilities placed upon 
the right to vote could further harm the black poor. This is increas-
ingly the situation faced by minority groups across the country.4s Col-
lective violence may become explicable within this context, but (in the 
United States, at any rate) it is difficult to see how it can lead to a 
solution to the problems of injustice and inequality (pp. 181-200). 
3. In a helpful comparison of the Miami Riot of 1980 with the 
"massive street riots" in Liverpool, England, the following year, Philip 
Jenkins and Fred Hutchings49 evaluate collective violence in terms 
similar to those used by Porter and Dunn as well as Ball-Rokeach and 
Short. Emphasizing the decline of class position experienced by 
Miami's blacks coupled with waves of unemployment and right-wing 
direction in national policy (shared by the underclass of Miami with 
that of Brixton and Liverpool), collective violence becomes an increas-
ingly likely event: 
[T]he Kerner analysis of the riots as primarily a response to eco-
nomic crisis and relative deprivation holds good; but the economic back-
ground has grown far, far worse, and improvement is not in sight in this 
fact that the number of whites killed by blacks in riots is significant to black self-confidence, self. 
respect, and ability to deal with previous fear of white violence). 
47. See Davis, supra note 41, at 31-33; T.B. EDSALL, supra note 41, at 179-242; W.D. BURN· 
HAM, THE CURRENT CRISIS IN AMERICAN PoLmcs (1982); Chase, The Left On Rights: An 
Introduction, 62 TEXAS L. REv. 1541, 1545-53 (1984) (most of contemporary American theory 
of judicial review is rendered pointless by its dependence on the assumption that electoral politics 
in the United States is democratic). 
48. Cloward & Piven, Trying to Break Down the Barriers: The Registration Strategy - l 241 
NATION 433, 435-36 (1985): 
[T]he 1982-84 drive expanded the active electorate without reducing its upscale tilt; it was a 
class stalemate. . . . Future registration campaigns are also likely to end in a class stalemate. 
Despite losing four of the last five Presidential elections, the Democratic National Commit-
tee does not seem ready to enlist new constituencies from the bottom, and the Republican 
National Committee and kindred right-wing movements have the financial resources, the 
organizational competence and the commitment to register enough people from the higher 
strata so as to equal or exceed non-partisan efforts among low-income groups. . • • The main 
organizing lesson of the 1982-84 registration campaign is that there is little hope for a more 
representative electorate until the registration system is reformed. The question is how to 
accomplish that in the face of opposition by the political parties. 
For analyses of how the electoral system of American capitalism arrived at its present state of 
malevolence and what might still be done to democratize that system, see also Cloward & Piven, 
How to Get Out the Vote in 1988: The Registration Strategy-IL 241 NATION 547 (1985); Right 
Turn: 1984 U.S. Elections, in THE YEAR LEFT: AN AMERICAN SOCIALIST YEARBOOK 1985, 
at 1 (1985); K. ANDERSON, THE CREATION OF A DEMOCRATIC MAJORITY, 1928-1936 (1979). 
49. Jenkins & Hutchings, New Patterns of Urban Riots: Miami and Liverpool, in COM PARA· 
TIVE CRIMINOLOGY 69-85 (I. Barak-Glantz & E. Johnson eds. 1983). 
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century. Perhaps it is not to be hoped for within the present social or 
economic framework Riots on the 1960s pattern are therefore very 
likely to recur in this decade - probably_ on at least as large a scale, and 
probably on new and more dangerous lines. Either they will be Miami 
riots, setting community against community, or they will be Liverpool 
riots, challenging governments and the social order. 50 
There could be no more appropriate note on which to close this 
review than the one sounded by Jenkins and Hutchings: that solutions 
to the problem of collective violence (and individual violence, as well) 
cannot be secured until we situate these forms of criminality within 
what Elliott Currie has described as the "larger, environing forces 
that, in fact, make or break living communities in the real world" 
(Curtis, p. 58), and deal effectively with these forces, even if it means 
radically altering our "present social or economic framework."51 In 
perhaps the best single survey of where the present "economic frame-
work" of late-imperial capitalist development is taking communities 
like Miami, Mike Davis points out: 
As immigration flows- both legal and illegal-approach the 1901-
1910 peak of trans-Atlantic migration, the long tracts of border zone 
have become an integrated economy of twin cities, one rich, one 
poor .... The accelerated formation of this borderlands economic system 
since the late 1960s has become integral to the new accumulation pat-
terns characterized by a coordinated expansion of low-wage employment 
and middle-strata affiuence .... Moreover, as labour-markets are trans-
nationalized, their segmentation grows more extreme, and wages become 
subject to determination by bantustan-like conditions of social reproduc-
tion. Thus the neo-colonial logic of Sunbelt capitalism ensures that no 
fundamental challenge can be mounted against the domestic low-wage 
economy without a simultaneous change in the borderland structure of 
hyper-unemployment and domination. 52 
50. Id. at 83 (emphasis added). The Jenkins and Hutchings prediction may already have 
proven partially correct. See After Brixton the Hard Choices, Manchester Guardian Weekly, 
Oct. 6, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (Wash. Post reprint ed.); Rosenzweig, Big Stick Approach to Britain's 
Black Problem, Manchester Guardian Weekly, Nov. 24, 1985, at 13, col. 1 (Wash. Post reprint 
ed.) (exploring the "explosions of racial violence that shook Great Britain in September and 
October" of 1985). 
51. Jenkins & Hutchings, supra note 49, at 83; see also E. LACLAU & C. MouFFE, HEGEM-
ONY AND SOCIALIST STRATEGY (1985). 
52. Davis, supra note 41, at 29. Davis' critique of contemporary capitalist develoment repre-
sents a sophisticated extension of the synthesis of two earlier modes of analysis, both generated in 
the 1960s. The first of these, initiated by Carl Oglesby at Antioch College in the summer of 1968, 
became known as the "Yankee/Cowboy" or "Rust Belt/Sunbelt" theoretical approach to ex-
plaining American demographic and political-economic change. See C. OGLESBY, THE YANKEE 
AND COWBOY WAR (1976); K. SALE, POWER SHIFT: THE RISE OF THE SOUTHERN RIM AND 
ITS CHALLENGE TO THE EASTERN EsTABLISHMENT (1975); K. PHILLIPS, THE EMERGING RE-
PUBLICAN MAJORITY (1969); W.D. BURNHAM, supra note 47; Hearn, The Corporatist Mood in 
the United States, 56 TELOS 41-57 (1983) (including bibliographic references to a range of works 
prescribing "industrial policy" solutions to the decline of the "rust belt" or "frost belt" region of 
the United States). 
The second 1960s trend of analysis on which Davis builds was initiated by dependency theo-
rists such as Andre Gunder Frank and Samir Amin and suggested that not only the relations 
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Thus the transformation of the "Magic City" into "murder city" 
(Dade County led the nation in murders for 1984)53 and the rise of 
between developed and less developed countries could be understood in terms of a "center/pe· 
riphery" metaphor, but that domestic relations within both developed and less developed coun-
tries themselves could also be explained in terms of metropole and periphery. See A.G. FRANK, 
CAPITALISM AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA (1968); A. G. FRANK, DEPEN· 
DENT ACCUMULATION AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT (1979); S. AMIN, UNEQUAL DEVELOP· 
MENT (1976); s. AMIN, IMPERIALISM AND UNEQUAL DEVELOPMENT (1977); Dependency 
Theory and Underdevelopment and Development, in A DICTIONARY OF MARXIST THOUGHT 115-
17, 498-500 (T. Bottomore ed. 1983); Buchanan, Center and Periphery: Reflections On the Irrele-
vance of a Billion Human Beings, MONTHLY REv., July-Aug. 1985, at 86-97. 
Davis' observations on "transnationalization" in the borderland economies with a resulting 
convergence of "first world" and "third world" political economy arc of great significance. See 
Terrence Todman, President Carter's Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 
quoted in Ambursley & Cohen, Crisis in the Caribbean: Internal Transformations and Extemal 
Constraints, in CRISIS IN THE CARIBBEAN 1, 18 (F. Ambursley & R. Cohen eds. 1983) (emphasis 
added): "We no longer see the Caribbean in the same stark military security context that we 
once viewed it. ... It is possibly an even more troublesome prospect: proliferation of impover-
ished third-world states whose economic and political problems blend with our own." See also 
Farer, Contadora: The Hidden Agenda, FOREIGN POLY., Summer 1985, at 59, 62: 
Significant segments of the educated elite throughout the Caribbean Basin are by now 
animated by any major American initiative. [Consider] [t]he long history of U.S. involve-
ment in their countries' destinies; the deep infiltration of American culture into their lives; 
the dense economic networks on which individual, family, and national well-being depend; 
and the profusion of personal ties and personal experiences (for example, Disneyland, 
Bloomingdale's, and the Inter-American Defense College) .... 
See also M. PUIG, BETRAYED BY RITA HAYWORTH (1968); G. CABRERA INFANTE, THREE 
TRAPPED TIGERS (1971). A popular xenophobic bumper sticker in South Florida reads: "Will 
the last American leaving Dade County please bring the flag." These are among the "larger, 
environing forces" outside of which it is difficult even to begin to understand the nature of violent 
crime in Miami. 
53. Voboril, Dade County Murder Rate Leads Nation, Miami Herald, July 28, 1985, at lA, 
col. 1: 
Dade County, nationally known for its exotic, violent crimi:, became the murder capital of 
the country last year, according to FBI statistics released Saturday. In 1984, Dade recorded 
425 murders, according to the fignres. That amounts to 23.7 murders per 100,000 Dade 
residents, the highest murder rate in any U.S. metropolitan area and three times the national 
level. Dade's overall crime rate was second only to that of metropolitan Atlantic City, N.J. 
See Thompson, A Dog Took My Place, ROLLING STONE, Aug. 4, 1983, at 18, 23: 
There is a whole new ethic taking shape in South Florida these days, and despite the rich 
Latin overlay, it is not so far from the taproot of the old American Dream. It is free enter-
prise in the raw, a wide-open Spanish-speaking kind of Darwinism, like the Sicilians brought 
to New York a hundred years ago and like the Japanese brought to Hawaii after World War 
II .... Rich is strong, poor is weak, and the government works for whoever pays its salaries. 
See also Bar Growth Fastest With Out-Of-State, South Florida Members, FLA. B. NEWS, July 1, 
1985, at 11, 11: 
Led by rapid growth in most areas of South Florida and in out-of-state members, the Flor-
ida Bar grew by 136.8 percent between 1973 and 1984 .... Harry McGinnis, director of Bar 
Planning and Evaluation, said the growth of attorneys in South Florida tracks the growth of 
the population there. But there are other reasons, he said, adding, "With nil the economic 
factors, it's a place for attorneys to practice." 
See also P. LERNOUX, IN BANKS WE TRUST 120-21 (1984): 
Miami, the Wall Street of the $79 billion narcotics traffic, has attracted more than one 
hundred banks from two dozen countries. The most prestigious address is Brickell Avenue, 
a block from the bay, where gold-and-black skyscrapers rise incongruously above the palm 
trees. Coral Gables, the Latin-American headquarters of some one hundred multinational 
corporations, is also considered a chic bank location .... The smaller the bank, the more 
dubious the buyers it is likely to attract. "In Miami they have a saying in Spanish: 'The 
sharks are on the streets, not in the sea' .... You wouldn't believe how many people come in 
here to ask if the bank is for sale .... " "We used to have the same problem," agreed 
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post-civil rights movement collective violence in peripheral garbage 
heaps of upper-class, air-conditioned white society's pleasure-domed 
urban landscape, may simply be a sign of the times. The one having 
the two: Miami/Liberty City, San Diego/Tijuana, Brownsville/Mata-
moros (cf. Johannesburg/Soweto) transcend the criminal justice/crim-
inal violence dichotomy and reveal the essential contour of our 
increasingly experimental relation to democracy in the U.S.A. 
Aristides Sastre, president of Republic National Bank, "but it's become less prevalent be-
cause we've grown so much. I don't know anywhere else in the United States where people 
just walk in off the street and offer to buy the bank." 
Lernoux's book is the best analysis of money, drugs, and politics in South Florida. 
